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Executive Summary
Widely televised firearm murders in many countries dur-
ing the 20th Century have spurred politicians to intro-
duce restrictive gun laws. The politicians then promise 
that the new restrictions will reduce criminal violence 
and “create a safer society.” It is time to pause and ask if 
gun laws actually do reduce criminal violence.
Gun laws must be demonstrated to cut violent crime 
or gun control is no more than a hollow promise. What 
makes gun control so compelling for many is the belief 
that violent crime is driven by the availability of guns 
and, more importantly, that criminal violence in general 
may be reduced by limiting access to firearms. 
In this study, I examine crime trends in Common-
wealth countries that have recently introduced firearm 
regulations: i.e., Great Britain, Australia, and Canada. 
The widely ignored key to evaluating firearm regulations 
is to examine trends in total violent crime, not just fire-
arms crime. Since firearms are only a small fraction of 
criminal violence, the public would not be safer if the 
new law could reduce firearm violence but had no effect 
on total criminal violence. 
The United States provides a valuable point of com-
parison for assessing crime rates because the criminal 
justice system there differs so drastically from those in 
Europe and the Commonwealth. Not only are criminal 
penalties typically more severe in the United States, often 
much more severe, but also conviction and incarceration 
rates are usually much higher. Perhaps the most striking 
difference is that qualified citizens in the United States 
can carry concealed handguns for self-defence. During 
the past few decades, more than 25 states in the United 
States passed laws allowing responsible citizens to carry 
concealed handguns. In 2003, there are 35 states where 
citizens can get such a permit. 
The upshot is that violent crime rates, and homicide 
rates in particular, have been falling in the United States. 
The drop in the American crime rate is even more im-
pressive when compared with the rest of the world. In 18 
of the 25 countries surveyed by the British Home Office, 
violent crime increased during the 1990s. This contrast 
should provoke thinking people to wonder what hap-
pened in those countries where they introduced increas-
ingly restrictive firearm laws. 
Britain
In the past 20 years, both Conservative and Labour gov-
ernments have introduced restrictive firearm laws; even 
banning all handguns in 1997. Unfortunately, these 
Draconian firearm regulations have totally failed. The 
public is not any safer and may be less safe. Police sta-
tistics show that England and Wales are enduring a seri-
ous crime wave. In contrast to handgun-dense United 
States, where the homicide rate has been falling for over 
20 years, the homicide rate in handgun-banning England 
and Wales has been growing. In the 1990s alone, the 
homicide rate jumped 50%, going from 10 per million in 
1990 to 15 per million in 2000.
Police statistics show that violent crime in general 
has increased since the late 1980s and, in fact, since 
1996 has been more serious than in the United States. 
The firearm laws may even have increased criminal vio-
lence by disarming the general public. Despite Britain’s 
banning and confiscating all handguns, violent crime, 
and firearm crime, continue to grow.
Australia
Following shocking killings in 1996, the Australian gov-
ernment made sweeping changes to the firearm legisla-
tion in 1997. Unfortunately, the recent firearm regula-
tions have not made the streets of Australia any safer. 
The total homicide rate, after having remained basically 
flat from 1995 to 2001, has now begun climbing again. 
The decline in homicide rate in the gun-permissive Unit-
ed States stands out against the trend in Australia. 
The divergence between Australia and the United 
States is even more apparent with violent crime. While 
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violent crime is decreasing in the United States, it is in-
creasing in Australia. Over the past six years, the over-
all rate of violent crime in Australia has continued to 
increase. Robbery and armed robbery rates continue to 
rise. Armed robbery has increased 166% nationwide. 
The confiscation and destruction of legally owned fire-
arms cost Australian taxpayers at least $500 million. 
The costs of the police services bureaucracy, including 
the hugely costly infrastructure of the gun registration 
system, has increased by $200 million since 1997. And 
for what? There has been no visible impact on violent 
crime. It is impossible to justify such a massive amount of 
the taxpayers’ money for no decrease in crime. For that 
kind of tax money, the police could have had more pa-
trol cars, shorter shifts, or maybe even better equipment. 
Think of how many lives might have been saved. 
Canada
In the 1990s, sweeping changes were made to the fire-
arms laws, first in 1991 and then again in 1995. Licensing 
and registration are still being phased in. The contrast 
between the criminal violence rates in the United States 
and in Canada is dramatic. Over the past decade, the 
rate of violent crime in Canada has increased while in 
the United States the violent crime rate has plummeted.
The Canadian experiment with firearm regulation is 
moving to farce. The effort to register all firearms, which 
was originally claimed to cost only $2 million, has now 
been estimated by the Auditor General to top $1 bil-
lion. The final costs are unknown but, if the costs of 
enforcement are included, the total could easily reach $3 
billion. Taxpayers would do well to ask for independent 
cost-benefit studies on registration to see how much the 
gun registry is already costing.
Restrictive firearm legislation has failed to reduce vi-
olent crime in Australia, Canada, or Great Britain. The 
policy of confiscating guns has been an expensive failure. 
Criminal violence has not decreased. Instead, it contin-
ues to increase. Unfortunately, policy dictates that the 
current directions will continue and, more importantly, 
it will not be examined critically. 
Only the United States has witnessed such a dramatic 
drop in criminal violence over the past decade. Perhaps it 
is time politicians in the Commonwealth reviewed their 
traditional antipathy to lawfully owned firearms.
It is an illusion that gun bans protect the public. 
No law, no matter how restrictive, can protect us from 
people who decide to commit violent crimes. Maybe we 
should crack down on criminals rather than hunters and 
target shooters?
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Widely televised firearm murders in France, Germany, 
and Switzerland in the past few years have spurred poli-
ticians in Europe to introduce changes in their countries’ 
already strict gun laws to make them even more restric-
tive. Most of us will remember the headlines about a de-
pressed student in Germany who ran amok and killed 
several people in his school after he had been expelled. 
In both France and Switzerland, angry individuals have 
stormed into local councils and begun shooting legisla-
tors seemingly at random. 
This is not a new story. We have seen this drama dra-
ma before, on television, from Australia, Great Britain, 
Canada, and the United States, as well as other coun-
tries. First, there is a horrible event—say, a disturbed 
student shoots people in a school or a maniac goes on a 
rampage in a public place. Media coverage is intense for 
a few weeks. Then, the government feels it must be seen 
as doing something to protect the public, so the police 
are given sweeping new powers or new restrictions are in-
troduced on owning firearms. Claims are made that the 
new firearm regulations will reduce criminal violence 
and create a safer society. Afterwards, the media rush 
off on a new story, and the public forgets. Later, there 
is another widely televised incident somewhere else and 
the process starts over again. The introduction of virtu-
ally every gun law in the past half-century around the 
world has followed this pattern. It is time to pause and 
ask: If gun laws are expected to work to prevent criminal 
violence, have they actually done so? 
Politicians promise that tightening up on gun regu-
lations will reduce criminal violence and make society 
safer. Some even claim outright that gun regulations will 
reduce suicide rates. But do they? Do increased restric-
tions upon the ownership of firearms reduce homicide 
rates? Armed robbery rates? Criminal violence in gen-
eral? Suicide rates? In short, do firearm regulations act to 
create a safer society as claimed by their supporters? 
If laws restricting the ownership of guns are supposed 
to reduce violent crime, then this must be demonstrated 
to be true or gun control is no more than a hollow prom-
ise. However, criminologists admit (albeit reluctantly) 
that there is very little empirical support for the claim 
that laws designed to reduce general access to firearms 
reduce criminal violence.1 Frequently, assertions that 
they do turn out to be wishful thinking. 
It is not that governments were not warned. The Cul-
len Commission had been presented with submissions 
from a variety of sources (e.g. English researcher and 
former Superintendent of Police, Colin Greenwood) ar-
guing that increasing restrictions would not be effective 
in reducing violent crime (Munday and Stevenson 1996; 
Greenwood 1972). In Canada, prior to the introduction 
of Bill C-68, which brought in licensing of owners and 
registration of firearms, the Auditor General of Canada 
warned the government that the Justice Minister had 
not presented any compelling justification for additional 
legislation nor had the effectiveness of previous legisla-
tion been evaluated (Auditor General of Canada 1993: 
647–55). I had testified before Parliament that firearm 
registration was “unworkable, ineffective, and outra-
geously expensive” (Mauser 1995: 25). At that time, I 
estimated that it could cost taxpayers as much as one 
billion dollars (Mauser 1995: 28). The Auditor General 
of Canada confirmed my prediction in 2002 (Auditor 
General of Canada 1993: chap. 10). Unfortunately, both 
estimates are low because they do not include costs by 
other cooperating government agencies nor the cost of 
enforcement. The best estimate to date of the cost to 
Canadian taxpayers for licensing owners and registering 
all guns is closer to 3 billion dollars (Breitkreuz 2003).
This study examines the claim that recently intro-
duced firearm regulations, which restrict public access to 
firearms, create a safer society by reducing criminal vio-
lence. The question being addressed here is not whether 
gun laws cause a drop—or an increase—in firearms 
crime. That is a distinctly different issue. At the very 
least, gun laws should act to reduce gun crime.2 The 
key question is: Do gun laws improve public safety? It is 
Introduction
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important to note that, even if firearm regulations were 
to cause a drop in firearms crime, other violent crimes 
may increase and so render society less safe. This follows, 
since firearms violence is only a fraction of criminal 
violence, often only a small fraction. To test the general 
claim that, by restricting access to firearms for the gen-
eral public, a society can reduce criminal violence, I will 
examine the trends in violent crime in a few countries 
that have recently introduced general firearm legislation. 
Where possible, these trends will be compared with cor-
responding trends in the United States. 
In assessing the impact of legislative changes, it is 
necessary to examine changes over time. This study will 
examine crime trends in each country to see if there are 
any changes after the introduction of the gun regulations. 
The crime rates selected are those that are the most ap-
propriate to evaluate public safety, the rates for homi-
cides, violent crime, and property crime. In addition, I 
will also look at the suicide rate since anti-gun activists 
often claim that reduced access to firearms reduces the 
temptation for vulnerable people to commit suicide.
Obviously, cross-national averages are irrelevant to 
this endeavour. This paper does not address, for example, 
whether the Canadian average for a particular crime rate 
is higher (or lower) than the United States or England. 
Such patterns speak to historical and cultural differ-
ences, not the effectiveness of recent firearm legislation. 
Only changes are pertinent to the question of interest. 
If the homicide rate was low before the firearm law was 
passed and it continues to stay low, how can we credit 
the firearm law with causing the low homicide rate? 
That said, the United States provides a valuable 
point of comparison with Europe and the Common-
wealth for assessing crime rates because the criminal jus-
tice system in the United States is unique.3 Not only are 
criminal penalties typically more severe in the United 
States, often much more severe, but also conviction and 
incarceration rates are usually much higher.4 Perhaps 
the most striking difference is that the United States is 
one of the few countries to encourage qualified citizens 
to carry concealed handguns for self defence. During 
the past few decades, while Britain and the Common-
wealth were making firearm ownership increasingly dif-
ficult, more than 25 states in the United States passed 
laws allowing responsible citizens to carry concealed 
handguns. There are now 35 states where citizens can 
get such a handgun permit. As a result, the number of 
armed Americans in malls, on the street, and in their 
cars has grown to almost 3 million men and women. As 
surprising as it may seem to casual observers, these new 
laws appear to have caused violent crime rates to drop, 
including homicide rates. Professor John Lott has shown 
how violent crime has fallen faster in those states that 
have introduced concealed carry laws than in the rest of 
the United States.5
The upshot is that violent crime rates, and homicide 
rates in particular, have been falling in the United States 
over the past decade.6 The drop in the American crime 
rate is even more impressive when compared with the 
rest of the world. In 18 of the 25 countries surveyed by 
the British Home Office, violent crime increased during 
the 1990s (Barclay et al. 1999). This contrast should pro-
voke thinking people to wonder what happened in those 
countries where they believed that introducing more and 
more restrictive firearm laws would protect them from 
criminal violence. 
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What makes gun control so compelling for many is the 
belief that violent crime is driven by the availability of 
guns and, more importantly, that criminal violence in 
general may be reduced by limiting access to firearms. 
This is a testable empirical proposition. 
To examine the claim that firearm legislation will 
improve public safety in general, the most appropriate 
yard-stick to use would be a broad measure such as to-
tal violent crime or homicide rate. Criminal violence 
involves any crime where an individual is injured and 
it includes crimes committed with any weapon, not just 
guns. Firearms are only involved in a fraction of violent 
crime, often only a small fraction. For example, between 
1% and 26% of violent crime incidents involve firearms 
in the countries examined here (table 1). 
Even in serious crimes, such as homicide and robbery, 
where the misuse of firearms is more prevalent, firearms 
are still used only in a minority of cases. Between 4% 
and 14% of robbers use a firearm in Australia, Canada, 
or England, while in the United States, less than half of 
robbers (42%) use firearms.7 A lower percentage of gun 
misuse may not be a blessing. Research shows that rob-
bery victims are less likely to be injured in crimes where 
the assailant uses a firearm.8 
Gun crimes may dominate the news but violence 
involving guns is not qualitatively worse than other 
violence: being bludgeoned to death is not less horrific 
than being shot to death. In this study, the United States 
stands out in that most murders (63%) are committed 
with firearms, while in Australia, Canada or England 
relatively few murderers use firearms (9%–31%).9 In the 
Commonwealth, knives are usually preferred to guns 
by murderers.10 For example, at least as many murders 
are committed with knives as guns in Canada and in 
Australia twice as many murders involve knives as guns 
(Dauvergne 2001: 8; Mouzos 2001).
Although suicide is not a violent crime, it is often 
included in the discussion of violence involving guns. 
Relatively few people (between 4% and 20%) use guns 
to commit suicide in the Commonwealth countries ex-
amined here. As usual, the United States is unique, with 
slightly more than half of suicides involving a gun (56%). 
Despite the higher percentage of gun suicides, the Unit-
ed States has a lower total suicide rate than either Aus-
tralia or Canada (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002; 
Preville 2003; NCIPC 2003).
Despite claims to the contrary, firearms are not 
uniquely more lethal than alternative means to commit 
Firearms and criminal violence
Table 1: An international comparison of the use of guns in violent crime
Violent Crime Homicide Robbery Suicide Accidents
United States (2001) 26% 63% 42% 56% 1%
Canada (2001) 3% 31% 14% 20% <1% 
Australia (2001) 1% [est.] 14% 6% 12% NA
England/Wales (00/01) 1% [est.] 9% 4% 2% NA
Note: This table shows the percentage of each category that involved guns. For example, 26% of violent crime in the United 
States in 2001 was committed using a firearm.
Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003; NCIPC 2003. Canada: Kwing Hung, March 2003; Savoie 2002. Australia: Aus-
tralian Institute of Criminology 2003; Mouzos 1999, 2003; Reuter and Mouzos 2002. England and Wales: Home Office 2001; 
Centre for Evidence Based Mental Health 2003.
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suicide. Hanging and carbon monoxide (e.g., by using 
vehicle exhaust) have approximately the same lethality 
as shooting (Kleck 1991: 258). It would appear obvious 
that the more determined a person is to commit suicide, 
the more likely he or she is to choose an effective method 
for doing so. As there is no shortage of lethal alternatives 
available to a person who wishes to end his or her life, 
restricting access to any one method—for example, fire-
arms or subway trains—still leaves available many other 
methods for achieving the same end.
Accidents involving guns, despite the media cover-
age they seem to generate, are quite rare. Typically, guns 
account for less than 1% of accidental deaths in any de-
veloped country. Perhaps this rarity is why they receive 
such emotional media attention. Vehicle accidents are 
far more common and pose a far greater risk to the pub-
lic than do gun accidents, yet car accidents receive little 
or no interest from the mainstream media. This is yet 
another example that media coverage does not indicate 
the seriousness of a threat. 
“Gun death” is a red herring, as it conflates two very 
different phenomena, homicide and suicide, to produce 
a large and misleading number (Mauser and Stanbury 
2003). It is inappropriate to use “gun deaths” to evaluate 
gun laws for several reasons. First, guns are not involved 
in the bulk of criminal violence, so “gun deaths” ignores 
much of importance for evaluating public safety. Sec-
ond, even though few people use guns to commit suicide, 
suicides by gunshot constitute the lion’s share of “gun 
deaths” in developed countries. For example, 80% of gun 
deaths in Canada are suicides, while 76% of gun deaths 
in Australia are suicides. Third, there is little support for 
the claim that gun laws of any sort reduce the suicide 
rate (Kleck 1997: 288; Jacobs 2002: 6).
In summary, the most appropriate measures to evalu-
ate public safety in general are global measures such as 
overall violent crime or homicide. Gun laws are certainly 
intended to reduce gun crime, but the more important 
question is whether gun laws can reduce overall crimi-
nal violence. Since gun crime is such a small fraction 
of criminal violence, it would be extremely misleading, 
particularly in Commonwealth countries, to use “gun 
crime” or “gun deaths” to evaluate the impact of any leg-
islation on public safety. Clearly, gun crime could decline 
for a number of reasons while total criminal violence in-
creases simultaneously. The main body of this paper will 
examine the claim that violent crime can be reduced by 
focusing on reducing gun crime. 
Do guns provoke murders?
Supporters of gun control like to claim that the avail-
ability of firearms somehow can provoke normal people 
to become violent and even to commit murder. This is 
false. This claim is analyzed at length elsewhere but a few 
points should be made briefly to illustrate the ground-
lessness of this claim (Kleck 1991: 205–06, 1997: 222–
24). While it may be true that we all have evil in our 
hearts, very few of us ever attempt to kill anyone. Murder 
is a rare event and the typical murderer is not normal 
and cannot legally own a firearm in any of the countries 
discussed here. 
In the developed world, the vast bulk of gun owners 
are hunters or target shooters. In Canada, for example, 
as table 2 shows, over two-thirds of gun owners say that 
hunting is their principal reason for owning a firearm. 
Gun owners are normal citizens as can be seen in table 3. 
Compared to the Canadian average, gun owners tend to 
be male, somewhat older, slightly less well educated, but 
earning an income that is higher than average.
It is a myth that murderers are “ordinary” people. 
Murders are usually committed by deviant people with 
a history of violence. Of course, these are not the kill-
ings that make the news. According to Statistics Canada, 
the typical murderer in Canada has an extensive crimi-
nal record, cannot legally possess firearms, abuses drugs 
Table 2:  Reasons reported for owning firearms
Hunting 73%
Target shooting 13%
Pest control 8%
Collection 6%
Protection 5%
Other 13%
Total 118%
Note: Total exceeds 100% because respondents could indi-
cate more than one reason for owning a firearm.
Source: GPC Research 2001: figure 11. 
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or alcohol, and is unemployed. Two-thirds of Canadian 
murderers are known to have an adult criminal record, 
as do over half of the victims (Dauvergne 2002). These 
are not normal Canadians. 
It is important to note that gun crimes are limited to 
a very small number of people. In Canada, for example, 
it is estimated that there are between 2.3 and 4.5 mil-
lion legal gun owners.11 There are around 10,000 violent 
crimes committed with guns annually.12 Even if these 
crimes were committed by previously law-abiding gun 
owners (and they are not), this would still represent less 
than 1% of all gun owners. The same argument, a for-
tiori, holds for firearms; very few guns are misused. There 
are between 7.9 and 15 million firearms in Canada. The 
same 10,000 gun crimes represent about one-tenth of 1% 
of the total gun stock. 
Supporters of gun control claim that every crimi-
nal gun starts out as a legal gun. This is used to suggest 
that legal gun owners (knowingly or unknowingly) are 
providing all, or almost all, of the firearms used by vio-
lent criminals. This is false. First, on an international 
level, a few countries illegally manufacture and distrib-
ute firearms presumably in order to promote terrorism. 
A number of these firearms fall into the hands of ordi-
nary criminals. Second, theft is not the primary source 
of guns used in criminal violence. In Commonwealth 
countries, a very small percentage of guns used in violent 
crime have ever been in the registration system. For ex-
ample, in England and Wales, between 13% and 16% of 
guns used in homicide had ever been registered (Home 
Office 2001: table 3D). In Canada, the number of reg-
istered handguns used in a homicide is estimated to be 
8%.13 In Australia, the share is also quite small: only 10% 
of guns used in a homicide were ever in the system.14 Nor 
is theft the primary source of guns used in homicides in 
the United States (Kleck 1997: 94). 
To the extent that stolen guns are involved in crimi-
nal violence, one needs to examine thefts from mili-
tary or police armories as well as individuals. A sizeable 
proportion of the gun stock in Canada is in the hands 
of the authorities and these guns are stored in large 
armories that are not always as well guarded as they 
should be. It is extremely difficult to estimate how many 
thefts take place annually from official armories, as sta-
tistics are unavailable. Nevertheless, one can speculate 
that firearms stolen from the police or military prob-
ably account for an important percentage of guns used 
in crime. At the international level, one of the major 
sources of guns for criminal activities is smuggling from 
sources such as military depots from decaying com-
munist countries (Landesman 2003; Polsby and Kates 
1997; Rummel 1994).
In summary, I have tried to show here that it is not 
reasonable to imagine firearms provoking normal peo-
ple to commit homicide or any other violent crime. The 
typical murderer is not normal and cannot legally own 
a firearm in any of the countries discussed here. There 
are so few gun crimes compared with the number of fire-
arms in any of the countries considered here that, if guns 
provoke people to kill, they are not doing a very good 
job of it. 
Table 3: Profile of firearm owners  
and the general population
Demographic Variables Owners of 
Firearms 
General 
Canadian 
Population
Gender
Male 88% 49%
Female 12% 51%
Age
18–34 15% 33%
35–54 49% 40%
Over 55 34% 27%
Education
High School or less 51% 43%
College/Some Post Secondary 28% 28%
Completed University 19% 30%
No response 2% 1%
Household Income
Under $20,000 8% 15%
$20,000 - $39,999 24% 24%
$40,000 - $59,999 25% 19%
$60,000 and over 33% 27%
No response 10% 15%
Source: GPC Research 2001: table 5. 
Note: Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.
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England and Wales
Firearm policy in the United Kingdom has been driven 
by sensationalized coverage of firearm murders for over 
15 years. First, in August 1987, the small town of Hun-
gerford, England, was stalked for eight hours by a de-
ranged man, who shot people seemingly at whim. By the 
time the killing was over, Michael Ryan had killed 16 
people and wounded another 14, before shooting himself 
(Malcolm 2002: 201). Media attention focused almost 
exclusively on how such a person had managed to obtain 
firearms legally, although in hindsight other matters are 
more amazing. The public was not shocked that the dis-
armed police could do nothing to stop him nor that no 
one in the town had the will or the means to resist. 
Almost 10 years later, in 1996, in Dunblane, Scot-
land, Thomas Hamilton, who was known to the police 
as mentally unstable, walked into a primary school with 
his legally registered handguns and murdered 16 young 
children and their teacher. Before killing himself, he 
wounded another 10 students and three teachers (Mal-
colm 2002: 203).  The media were outraged that citizens 
in Britain could own handguns, not that the police failed 
to follow the rules for granting the killer a firearm per-
mit. According to information presented to the Cullen 
Commission, Hamilton had been refused membership 
in several gun clubs, which had requested the police to 
revoke his permit. The police had not acted on these 
complaints (Cullen 1996).
The Firearms (Amendment) Act of 1988 was brought 
in by the Conservative government following the Hun-
gerford incident and the Firearms (Amendment) Act of 
1997, which banned all handguns, was introduced by 
the Labour government following the shooting in Dun-
blane in 1996 (Greenwood 2001; Munday and Stevenson 
1996). Unfortunately, these Draconian firearm regula-
tions have not curbed crime (see Malcolm 2002).  Police 
statistics show that England and Wales are enduring a 
serious crime wave. In contrast to North America, where 
the homicide rate has been falling for over 20 years, the 
homicide rate in England and Wales has been growing 
over the same time period. In the 1990s alone, the homi-
cide rate jumped 50%, going from 10 per million in 1990 
to 15 per million in 2000 (Home Office 2001).15
Police statistics show that violent crime in general has 
increased since the late 1980s and, in fact, since 1996 
has been more serious than in the United States (figure 
2).16 The rate of violent crime has jumped from 400 per 
100,000 in 1988 to almost 1,400 per 100,000 in 2000. (An 
unknown amount of the recent increase may be attrib-
uted to changes in the recording rules in 1998 and 1999.) 
In contrast, not only are violent crime rates lower in the 
United States, they are continuing to decline (Home Of-
fice 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003: table 1).
Property crime has also grown more serious since the 
early 1980s. Although property crime rates have fallen 
back somewhat in the 1990s, they are still higher in 1997, 
at over 8000 per 100,000 population, than they had been 
in 1982, at about 6,000 per 100,000) (figure 3). In contrast, 
property crime rates are falling in the United States (Home 
Office 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003).
Suicide rates have eased somewhat in England and 
Wales (table 4). In 1989, age standardized mortality rates 
for suicide of all types was 10 per 100,000 and, in 1999, 
it is now 9.5 per 100,000. Similarly, suicide rates in the 
United States have also declined—going from 12.4 to 
10.7 per 100,000 population—even as firearm ownership 
has risen (McIntosh 2000). 
The Home Office has also tightened up on enforce-
ment of regulations to such an extent that the legitimate 
sport-shooting community has been virtually destroyed. 
For example, shotgun permits have fallen almost 30% 
since 1988 (Greenwood 2001) (figure 5). The British 
Home Office admits that only one firearm in 10 used in 
homicide was legally held (Home Office 2001) (figure 6). 
But, there is little pressure from within bureaucratic and 
governmental circles to discontinue the policy of disarm-
ing responsible citizens. 
Can violent crime be reduced by stricter gun laws?
Figure 1: Homicide rates—England and the United States (1974–2000 / 2001)
Sources: Home Office 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003.
Figure 2: Violent crime rates—England and the United States (1988–2001)
Sources: Home Office 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003.
Figure 3: Property crime rates—England and the United States  (1982–1997)
Sources: Home Office 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003.
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Figure 5: Increase in robberies compared to decline in shotgun certificates issued—England and Wales
Source: Greenwood 2001.
Figure 4: Suicide rates—England and Wales compared to the United States
Sources: NCIPC 2003; National Statistics 2003.
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Clearly, there is no evidence that firearm laws have 
caused violent crime to fall. The firearm laws may even 
have increased criminal violence by disarming the gen-
eral public. Despite banning and confiscating all hand-
guns, violent crime—and firearm crime—continue to 
grow. The number of violent crimes involving hand-
guns has increased from 2,600 in 1997/1998 to 3,600 
in 1999/2000. Firearm crime has increased 200% in the 
past decade. 
Australia
Publicity surrounding a multiple murder triggered recent 
changes in Australian firearm policy. In Port Arthur, 
Tasmania, on April 28, 1996, Martin Bryant, a mentally 
deranged man, went on a rampage murdering anyone 
he encountered. The media afterwards focused almost 
exclusively on the killer’s use of military-style semi-auto-
matic firearms. The police arrived, surrounded the iso-
lated building, and began negotiations. When he tried 
to escape, he was quickly captured (Bellamy 2003). In 
all, he killed 35 people and seriously injured another 18. 
He was tried and sentenced to life in prison (Guirguis 
2003). Confusion remains over many of the details of 
this incident, including how Bryant came to have the 
Figure 6: Legal status of firearms used in homicides—England and Wales (1992–1998)
Note: Of the guns legally held, 11 were stolen from their owners, one of whom was a victim (p. 66).
Source: Home Office 2001: table 3D.
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firearms he used, and whether or not the police response 
was adequate. No Royal Commission has ever examined 
the incident. The media focus on the type of firearms 
used at Port Arthur has diverted public concern over 
police procedures. 
Following garish media coverage of the Tasmania 
killings, in 1997 the Australian government brought in 
sweeping changes to the firearm legislation. The new 
controls on firearms introduced included the prohibi-
tion and confiscation of almost 600,000 semi-automatic 
“military style” firearms from their licensed owners as 
well as new licensing and registration regulations (Law-
son 1999; Reuter and Mouzos 2002). 
Unfortunately, these new firearm regulations do 
not appear to have made the streets of Australia safer. 
Consider homicide rates. Homicide involving firearms 
is declining but the total homicide rates have remained 
basically flat from 1995 through to 2001 (Mouzos 2001). 
However, early reports show that the national homicide 
rate may have begun climbing again. Mouzos (2003) 
reports that homicides in 2001/02 increased by 20% 
from 2000/01. She also reports that, despite the declin-
ing firearm homicides, there is an increase in multiple 
victim incidents. Homicide rates remain at a historic 
high. Shortly after World War II, the Australian ho-
micide rate was around 1 per 100,000. Since then, it 
has climbed until it peaked at 2.4 per 100,000 in 1988 
(Graycar 2001).
The decline in homicide rate in the United States 
stands out against the flat—or even rising—homicide 
rate in Australia (figure 7). The divergence between 
Australia and the United States is even more apparent 
when one considers violent crime (figure 8). While vio-
lent crime is decreasing in the United States, it continues 
to increase in Australia. Over the past 6 years, both as-
sault and robbery show no signs of decreasing (Austra-
lian Institute of Criminology 2003) (figure 9). It is too 
early to tell whether the gun ban has exacerbated the 
problem or simply not had any effect. 
Recent changes in the firearm law appear to have 
had no impact upon the suicide rate (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2001) (figure 10). Despite the new prohibi-
tions and firearm buybacks, the suicide rate in Australia 
continues to rise. This contrasts with the slight decline 
in suicide rates in the United States even while the avail-
ability of firearms continues to increase. 
The destruction of the confiscated firearms cost 
Australian taxpayers an estimated $AUS500 million 
and has had no visible impact on violent crime (Lawson 
1999). The costs do not include the costs of bureaucracy, 
which, as has been shown in Canada, can be consider-
able. Robbery and armed robbery rates continue to rise. 
Armed robbery has increased 166% nationwide—jump-
ing from 30 per 100,000 in 1996 to 50 per 100,000 in 
1999 (Australian Institute of Criminology 2001; Mouzos 
and Carcach 2001). The homicide rate has not declined 
Figure 9: Robbery rates—Australia and the United States
Sources: Australian Institute of Criminology 2003; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003: table 1.
Figure 7: Homicide rates—Australia and the United States
Sources: Australian Institute of Criminology 2003; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003: table 1:
Figure 8: Violent crime rates—Australia
Sources: Australian Institute of Criminology 2003.
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Figure 10: Suicide rates—Australia and the United States
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002; NCIPC 2003.
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and the share of firearm homicide involving handguns 
has doubled in the past five years (Mouzos 2001). The 
proposed solution to the failure of gun regulations is ban-
ning handguns, even though, as in Great Britain and 
Canada, few firearms used in homicide are legally held; 
in 1999/2000 only 12 out of 65 (18%) were identified as 
being misused by their legal owner (Mouzos 2001).
Canada
As in other countries, recent changes in firearm policy 
were precipitated by a media frenzy over a multiple mur-
der. On December 6, 1989, Marc Lepine, born Gamil 
Gharbi, went to the University of Montreal campus, 
where he wandered around the halls of the engineering 
building shooting people he encountered while shouting 
hatred for feminists. In one classroom, after sending the 
men from the room, he shot the remaining women. In all, 
he killed 14 women and wounded another 13 students, 
including four men, before he finally shot himself (Jones 
1998). Even though he encountered almost one hundred 
students and at least three teachers, no one tried to stop 
the murderer. Most did what they were told.
An investigation by the Montreal coroner severely 
criticized the police for their inadequate response (Mac-
Donald 1990). The police did not even arrive until after 
the killings were over. After taking 30 minutes to arrive 
at the university campus, the police could not find the 
engineering building. The coroner’s office stated that 
the type of weapon used was not a significant factor 
in the murders. Nevertheless, activists used this hid-
eous crime to launch a campaign that promoted tighter 
firearm restrictions as the way to protect women from 
male violence and, as a result, Canada twice introduced 
sweeping changes to its firearms laws, first, in 1991, 
under the Conservative government and then again, 
in 1995, before the first changes had been fully imple-
mented, under the Liberals. The 1995 Firearms Act is 
still being phased in. 
The Canadian government uses the falling homi-
cide rate and the falling rate of violent crime to sup-
port the claim that these firearm laws are working to 
reduce criminal violence. Unfortunately for this argu-
ment, the homicide rate has been falling as fast or faster 
in the United States (figure 11), where during the same 
time frame, more than 25 states have introduced less re-
strictive firearm laws. The homicide rate in the United 
States has fallen from 10.5 per 100,000 in 1991 to 6.1 per 
100,000 while the Canadian rate has fallen from 2.7 per 
100,000 to 1.8.
The contrast between the rate of criminal violence in 
the United States and that in Canada is much more dra-
matic (figure 12). Over the past decade, the Canadian 
rate of violent crime has stayed basically flat while, in 
the United States during the same time period, the rate 
of violent crime has slid from 600 per 100,000 to 500 per 
100,000 (Gannon 2001).17
Econometric studies undercut the claim that firearm 
legislation caused the homicide rate in Canada to de-
Figure 11: Homicide rates—Canada and the United States
Sources: Kwing Hung 2003; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003: table 1.
Figure 12: Violent crime rates—Canada and the United States
Sources: Savoie 2002; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003: table 1. 
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cline. This is clearly seen in a study that Professor Rich-
ard Holmes and I did, where we found that firearm leg-
islation had no significant impact on the homicide rate 
(Mauser and Holmes 1992) (figure 13). In this study, 
we analyzed the effect of six independent variables on 
the homicide rate for each province from 1968 through 
1988. The length of the horizontal lines indicate the 
strength of the independent variables. Lines that extend 
to the right are positively associated with the homicide 
rate, while those that extend to the left are negatively as-
sociated. Any T-ratio over 1.65 is statistically significant. 
As hypothesized, the 1977 Firearm Law is negatively as-
sociated with the Canadian homicide rate, although not 
significantly. The other independent variables are all in 
the expected direction, and significant. 
Nor does firearm legislation operate to reduce other 
violent crimes. Professor Dennis Maki and I have shown 
that Canadian gun laws may even have caused an in-
crease in armed robbery (Mauser and Maki 2003). In 
this study, we looked at the impact of nine independent 
variables upon three related dependent variables: (a) 
armed robbery, (b) armed robberies involving firearms, 
and (c) total robberies for each province from 1974 
through 1992. We analyzed each of the dependent vari-
ables separately (figure 14). As in figure 13, the length 
of the horizontal lines indicate the strength of the in-
dependent variables. Lines that extend to the right are 
positively associated with the dependent variable, while 
those that extend to the left are negatively associated. 
Any T-ratio over 1.65 is statistically significant. The 
Figures 14: Evaluating the 1977 Canadian Firearms Law—Robbery
Sources: Mauser and Maki 2003.
Figure 13: Evaluating the 1977 Canadian Firearms Law—Homicide
Sources: Mauser and Holmes 1992.
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Figure 15: Property crime rates—Canada and the United States
Sources: Savoie 2002; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003: table 1.
Figure 16: Total suicide rate and rate of suicide via firearms—Canada
Source: Preville 2003.
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results of all three analyses are quite similar. The power 
of econometric analysis is that the model accounts for 
the most important other factors as co-variates. Profes-
sor Maki and I found that once we factored out the ef-
fects of the other variables, the Canadian gun law still 
had a significant effect. Unfortunately, this effect was 
positive, that is to say, the gun law acted to increase 
criminal violence. Nearly identical trends are seen in 
property crime rates, which are declining both in Can-
ada and in the United States (figure 15). 
Suicide rates have been stable in Canada at the same 
time they have been declining in the United States (fig-
ure 16). Despite a drop in suicide involving firearms, no 
impact can be seen in the total Canadian suicide rate, 
which recently has begun to increase again (Preville 
2003). The lack of linkage is one of the points obscured 
by the misleading factoid of “gun death.” By creating this 
pseudo-scientific amalgam of suicide, homicide, and ac-
cidental deaths, anti-gun activists impede a serious un-
derstanding of the link between government policy and 
the misuse of firearms.
The Canadian experiment with firearm regulation is 
moving towards farce. Although it was originally claimed 
that this experiment would cost only CDN$2 million, 
the Auditor General reported that the effort to register 
all firearms has now topped CDN1$ billion. The final 
costs are unknown but, if the costs of enforcement are 
included, estimates now reach CDN3$ billion.
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Conclusion
This brief review of gun laws shows that disarming the 
public has not reduced criminal violence in any coun-
try examined here: not in Great Britain, not in Canada, 
and not in Australia. In all cases, disarming the public 
has been ineffective, expensive, and often counter pro-
ductive. In all cases, the means have involved setting 
up expensive bureaucracies that produce no noticeable 
improvement to public safety or have made the situa-
tion worse. The results of this study are consistent with 
other academic research, that most gun laws do not have 
any measurable effect on crime (Kleck 1997: 377; Jacobs 
2002). As I have argued elsewhere (Mauser 2001a),
the history of gun control in both Canada and the 
Commonwealth demonstrates the slippery slope of 
accepting even the most benign appearing gun con-
trol measures. At each stage, the government either 
restricted access to firearms or prohibited and confis-
cated arbitrary types of ordinary firearms. In Canada, 
registration has been shown to mean eventual con-
fiscation. As well, police search powers have been in-
creased. The expansion of the state’s search and sei-
zure powers should be taken very seriously by all civil 
libertarians concerned about the erosion of Canadi-
ans’ individual rights. Canada’s democratic institu-
tions may also have been damaged by the transfer of 
what many would consider legislative powers to both 
the police and cabinet under firearm legislation. 
Firearm registration also violates the basic rules 
of policing set forth in the 1820s by Sir Robert Peel, 
the founder of the first professional police force, the 
British Bobbies. In order for laws to be enforced ef-
fectively, the police must have the support of citizens 
being policed. However, experience in several coun-
tries shows that passive resistance to firearms regis-
tration is widespread. Instead of seeing gun control 
as a policy response to violent crime, it is more useful 
to view it as the product of conflict between urban 
and rural cultures (Kleck 1996). Much as the tem-
perance movement was an attempt to impose rural 
values upon urban residents, firearm registration may 
be seen as an attempt by urbanites to impose their 
cultural values upon the rest of society.
The demonization of average people who hap-
pen to own a gun lays the foundation for a massive 
increase in governmental intrusiveness in the lives 
of ordinary citizens. Firearm registration and owner 
licensing threatens long-standing Canadian liberties 
and freedoms. The type of gun control Canada has 
enacted is not consistent with many democratic prin-
ciples and the protection of civil liberties. Neverthe-
less, Canada is spearheading a move in the United 
Nations to impose a similar regime of draconian re-
strictions around the world.
Disarming the public greatly increases cynicism about 
government among much of the population and it di-
minishes their willingness to comply with other, future 
regulations that might even be more sensible. The sense 
of alienation grows with the severity of the restrictions 
and with the ineffectiveness of their result. Unfortu-
nately, policy dictates that the current directions will 
continue and, more important, will not be examined 
critically. This last is a guarantee of the increase of that 
future alienation. 
It will only worsen as the mass media become slowly 
aware that their bias towards the banning of guns has 
been misdirected and begin shifting their attention to 
the large quantities of money that have been wasted in 
pursuit of a dream of social engineering that was doomed 
from the start. 
Only the United States has witnessed a dramatic 
drop in criminal violence over the past decade. The jus-
tice system in the United States differs in many ways 
from those in the Commonwealth but one of the impor-
tant reasons for the drop in violent crime may be that 
responsible citizens are increasingly carrying concealed 
handguns (Lott 2000). In contrast, authorities in the 
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Commonwealth insist upon a monopoly of force. If the 
goal is deterring criminal violence, perhaps it is time for 
Commonwealth countries to encourage more individual 
self-reliance.
Gun laws may not reduce violent crime but crimi-
nal violence causes gun laws—at least, well-publicized 
crimes do. The only winner in this drama is bureaucracy. 
The rest of us lose liberty as well as safety. It is an illusion 
that further tinkering with the law will protect the pub-
lic since no law, no matter how restrictive, can protect us 
from people who decide to commit violent crimes. There 
have always been criminals, and there have always been 
deranged people. Murder has been illegal for thousands 
of years: we need only remember the saga of Cain and 
Abel. The mass media find gun crimes more newsworthy 
but multiple civilian murders by arson have historically 
claimed more lives than incidents involving firearms. 
The truth is we live in a dangerous world and the govern-
ment cannot protect us, if for no other reason than the 
police cannot be everywhere. We must ultimately rely 
upon ourselves and it is only right we have the necessary 
tools to do so.
The Fraser Institute 21 The Failed Experiment
1 Perhaps the best known are Gary Kleck (1997: 377) 
and Colin Greenwood (1972: 240) but similar state-
ments have been made by James B. Jacobs (2002) and 
Peter Reuter and Jenny Mouzos (2002) in their pre-
sentation to the American Society of Criminology.
2 There is little evidence that gun laws are effective. 
For example, Joyce Malcolm (2002) convincingly 
demonstrates that English gun laws have backfired 
and are actually causing both gun crime and violent 
crime to increase.
3 For a more thorough discussion of the differences 
among a wide variety of countries, including the 
United States, see Kopel 1992.
4 These points have been made most tellingly by Patrick 
Langan and David Farrington (1998), who compare the 
criminal justice systems of the United States with that 
of England and Wales. Marie Gannon (2001) also com-
pares crime rates in the United States and Canada. 
5 See John Lott 2000, 2003. Despite being subjected 
to severe empirical scrutiny by critics, his basic asser-
tions still stand. 
6 These trends are easily seen in the Uniform Crime Re-
ports (UCR) data on the website of the federal Bureau 
of Investigation (http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm). 
7 It is important to remember that the United States 
has long been a violent country. Some observers be-
lieve this is due to long standing problems of racism 
and poverty. As mentioned earlier, the question 
under study in this paper is the effectiveness of recent 
firearm legislation, not basic historic or cultural dif-
ferences among countries. 
8 Gary Kleck (1997: 238) speculates that one reason 
for this might be that the assailant armed with a 
firearm can command compliance from his victim 
without first injuring him. 
9 The United States is not the most violent country 
in the developed world. That distinction belongs to 
Russia, which has a murder rate two to three times 
higher than that of the United States, despite having 
draconian gun laws that are very strictly enforced 
(Miron 2001: 624).
10 Jamaica is a glaring exception: despite draconian 
firearm laws, firearms are used in about two-thirds of 
all homicides and over half of all robberies (Edwards 
1999: 30).
11 The Canadian Justice Centre officially claims there are 
2.3 million gun owners in Canada; my best estimate 
(2001b) is that there are 4.5 million gun owners. 
12 This estimate is based upon a recent report from Statis-
tics Canada and an earlier special request to Statistics 
Canada. Josée Savoie (2002) reports there are almost 
4,000 violent crimes that involved a firearm but this does 
not include any assaults that might have used a firearm.
13 Handguns are the most common type of firearm used in 
homicide in Canada, and up until recently, the only type 
of firearm that was registered (Dauvergne 2001: 10).
14 Only 11 of the 117 homicides committed with a fire-
arm between 1997 and 1999 involved a firearm le-
gally held by the perpetrator (Mouzos 2000: 4).
15 According to police statistics published by the Scot-
tish Executive (2001), the homicide rate in Scotland 
has also increased during this same time period, 
going from 16 per million population to 21 per mil-
lion population.
16 Recent survey data show a decline in violent crime 
but this is not reflected in police data (Simmons et 
al. 2002).
17 The comparison here shows the official statistics from 
both countries. Gannon (2001) constructs indices of 
violent crime that are more directly comparable. In 
her analysis, the trends in violent crime in the two 
countries resemble each other more closely, but her 
data also show that violent crime in Canada is in-
creasing while it is decreasing in the United States. 
18 This study is consistent with almost all other research 
on Canadian firearm legislation. The only studies 
that have found an impact have been funded by the 
Canadian Department of Justice. 
Notes
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